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Introduction
Any examination of the role of values in decisions on risk must take
into consideration the increasing reliance on the expert judgment
method. Today, reliance on expert judgment is conspicuously present
in the documents and work associated with site characterization of
Yucca Mountain as a host for the United States' first high level nuclear
waste repository. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
encourages the use of probabilistic risk assessment's state of the art
technology as a complement to deterministic approaches to nuclear
regulatory activities. 1 It considers expert judgment as one of those
technologies. At the 1998 International Conference on High Level
Nuclear Waste Development, several presentations reported on the use
2
of expert elicitation sessions held during 1997 at Yucca Mountain.
Over a decade ago, few guidelines existed for U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) work in expert judgment. In an analysis of these
guidelines, I described the author-advocates view of the role of values in
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See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Branch Technical Position on the Use of
Expert Elicitation in the High-Level Radioactive Waste Program (NUREG-1563, 1996)
[hereinafter BTP].
See K. Coopersmith et al., Use of Expert Elicitation to Quantify Uncertainties in Process
2
Models for Total System Performance Assessment, American Nuclear Society, The
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference High Level Radioactive Waste
Management (May 1998); J. H. Lee et al., Use of Expert Elicitations for Modeling Waste
Package Degradationat the Potential Yucca Mountain Repository, American Nuclear Society,
The Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on High Level Radioactive Waste
Management, Las Vegas, NV (May 1998).
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this method of risk assessment. 3 I suggested that the guidelines
assume nalve positivism. 4 I noted that the creators of these guidelines
also tended toward scientific realism in their apologetic tone that expert
judgment falls short of representing the way nature is (as, presumably a
deterministic approach would). 5 I also pointed to a tendency toward
what I call a heightened or super-realism. Normal science (field studies,
empirical tests) represents the way the world is and for expert judgment
this is only likely so. Expert judgment method, however, is capable of
truly capturing expertise in a representative sense.
The purpose of this paper is to examine new guidelines from the
DOE and the NRC, with a view to eliciting the epistemological
assumptions about the role of values and the status of objectivity
claimed for this method. Do these new guidelines also adopt naYve
positivism? Does the inability to encounter raw, pure, value-neutral
expert judgment reveal itself in these guidelines? Or, do these
guidelines adopt the belief that values are not (and should not be)
mixed directly into judgments, accounting for their sweet or bitter
taste? And, is there a shift from away from the apologetic scientific
realism of the earlier guidelines to that of anti-realism? An analysis of
expert judgment method's commitment to value neutrality raises
questions, too, for the prospects of rationality. The purpose of
examining these guidelines is not to simply assert that values hide out in
the expert judgment method's determination of risk, but also to
examine the possibilities for adjudication of values and interests under
an epistemologically sophisticated understanding of rationality.
3 See Patricia A. Fleming, Expert Judgment and High Level Nuclear Waste Management,
10 Policy Studies Rev. 114 (1992).
4 Among the naive positivist's epistemic commitments is the belief in a sharp distinction
between fact and value. Values, if they have any role to play in risk assessment via expert
judgment, do so in the "context of discovery." Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction
6-7 (1938). This context remains external to the actual method of expert elicitation, its
normative analyses and its reliance on decision-theoretic procedures. Naive positivists believe
that the value-neutrality of the context of justification (method) insures that objectivity in risk
assessment is maintained. For the last four decades, this epistemological stance has been
challenged. Critics, within and without positivism, have asserted the epistemic impossibility of
maintaining such a simplistic fact/value distinction.
5 They assert that, while there is a chance that conclusions based on expert judgment may be
true about the world, it is not a good idea to say so because there is no justification in the
method that allows this.
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The Department of Energy Guidelines
On May 22, 1995, the DOE circulated its "Principles and
Guidelines for Formal Use of Expert Judgment by the Yucca Mountain
Site Characterization Project." 6 This document was created in
response to the recommendations made by the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board, a Congressionally constituted oversight body,
in its "10th Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of
Energy." 7 Earlier the NRC recommended that the DOE "state
criteria for the formal use of expert judgment to assure that objective,
quantitative analyses based on empirical data are used in preference to
expert elicitation wherever possible." 8 The NRC's concern over DOE
use of expert judgment is articulated in a steady stream of documents.
The major theme of such concern focuses on over-reliance of the
method when "objective" data could be gathered, and on failure to
address the potential for bias and conflict of interest by relying almost
entirely on internal expertise.
Hence, Principles and Guidelines is intended to be read as
representing the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management's
position on when the formal application of expert judgment is
appropriately used in the Yucca Mountain Project. In fact, it tends to
read as a philosophical view of expertise and its role in the decisionmaking process of determining suitability. Relatively little mention is
made of the actual methodology of expert elicitation. Although it was
not intended to serve as a management plan or a procedure for
application of the methodology, it has functioned significantly and
recently as a guide for expert elicitation. Several things are noteworthy
about this document that help in the analysis of the DOE's views on the
role of values in risk assessment.

6
See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management - Yucca Mountain Site
Characterization Office, U.S. DOE Principles and Guidelines for Formal Use of Expert
Judgment by the Yucca Mountain Site CharacterizationProject (1995) [hereinafter Principles

& Guidelines].
7 See U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Report to the U.S. Congress and the
Secretary of Energy (1994).
8
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Staff Site CharacterizationAnalysis of the
Department of Energy's Site CharacterizationPlan, Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada, at 4-10
(NUREG-1347, 1989).
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"

Expert judgment is implicit and explicit
"The choice is not whether to use expert judgment, but rather
how to use it: is the use implicit or explicit; is the application
informal or formal ...9 This question-statement conveys the

DOE's recognition of the pervasive and often implicit and informal
role of judgment (presumably expert, if used in reference to
technical matters) throughout the site characterization process. So,
the question of "how to use" expert judgment is really a decision of
whether to use a formal, well-documented, explicit form of expert
judgment, such as expert elicitation or peer review. Moreover,
expert judgment broadly denotes a method for the interpretation
of data. The DOE document states that data must always be
interpreted in light of judgment-based models. Interpretation of
data in a consistent framework, with adequate treatment of
assumptions and uncertainties, creates the technical basis required to
aid management decision-making.
* Expert judgment is incomplete
"Perceptions regarding the relationship between the results of a
decision-aiding process (sic expert judgment) and the decision
itself can be viewed by decision-makers as inappropriately limiting
their discretion to consider other information or values in reaching
a decision." 10 This statement is meant to clarify the DOE belief
that management must not be confined to a deduction from the
results of expert judgment. The risk assessments provided in expert
judgment elicitations are technical in nature and do not exhaust all
the elements taken up in decisions related to regulatory compliance
or programmatic issues. This is consistent with the DOE's earlier
finding that it has not "been able to determine the framework for a
predetermined method that would be sufficiently complete to
eliminate the exercise of judgment on the part of Federal officials
who will make these decisions." 1 1

9 Principles & Guidelines, supra note 6, at 1.
10 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
11 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 10 C.F.R. Part 960; General Guidelines for the
Recommendation of Sites for the Nuclear Waste Repositories, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,727 (1984).
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Expert judgment does not extend to value judgments
"The Project has no plans to make use of formal methods for
dealing with the value judgments made by the DOE's managers in
the decision-making process." 12 This method, it is claimed, cannot
be expected to address the non-technical aspects of management
decision.
* No absolute standard of no prior involvement in DOE-sponsored
work
"It is not practical for ... selection as an external expert for an
"

elicitation to be predicated on an absolute standard of no prior
involvement in, or review of, DOE-sponsored work." 13 The
emphasis, instead, should be placed on the diversity of technical
disciplines and views that can be acquired of well-qualified experts.
To get that diversity, DOE personnel may be required to
participate in expert elicitation sessions.
The DOE's view about the role of values in risk assessment as
performed by experts emerges from the claims above. If that picture
were purely positivistic in character, the DOE document would be less
prone to admit both the pervasiveness of judgment throughout the
characterization process and the necessity for interpretation of the data.
Strict, naive positivists tend to be blind to the underdetermination of a
hypothesis by the data. This underdetermination has motivated the
discussion in science on the epistemological function of interpretation in
resolving model/hypothesis confirmation.
In its claim that expert judgment is incomplete, the DOE appears
to understand the distinction between risk assessment and risk
acceptance. True, regulatory decisions will be based on other factors as
well as expert judgment, such as programmatic risk, cost, and
scheduling. It is clear to the DOE that these latter factors all involve
value judgments. And, insofar as risk assessment is characterized by
expert judgment method, values play no intrinsic role in that method.
The post-positivist (and even some less naive positivists) would find this
unacceptable. Risk assessment appeals to values in ways that risk
acceptance does not. It is not devoid of values.
12
13

Principles & Guidelines, supra note 6, at 1.
Id. at 8.
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The claim that expert judgment does not extend to value judgment
expresses the concomitant epistemological belief that objectivity is not
possible in the making of value judgments. This is inferred from the
alignment of objectivity with expert judgment. This reinforces the
objective-subjective distinction sedimented in the view that values
concern the less technical and indeed non-objective aspects of decisionmaking. This distinction sets up the problem of rationality in final
decision-making in the political arena. Only the results of expert
judgment are capable of objectivity. All hell breaks loose when we come
to the political arena. Objectivity and its partner, rationality, will prevail
only if we let science decide. And, as the DOE claims, science cannot
be the final arbiter. This distinction fertilizes the notion that political
consensus can only be based in political will, devoid of rationality.
The DOE recognizes that its expert elicitations might be charged
with bias because so much DOE work has used internal (i.e., DOE and
DOE subcontractors) expertise. A concern with bias is firmly rooted in
a positivistic epistemology and is one of the mortal sins of the objective
method. Post-positivists are also concerned with bias and take pains to
distinguish egregious acts of self-vested risk assessments from
necessarily value-laden ones. Bias is put at the extreme end of a
spectrum no risk assessor can escape. So, a preoccupation with bias can
function as a red herring, throwing one's attention away from epistemic
valuation assumed by the methodologies of decision theory.
Interestingly, the DOE is almost post-positivist in its view of the
potential for bias. The agency does not apologize for its involvement in
expert elicitation qua subject-matter experts (an NRC term). It wants
a diversity of views represented in an expert elicitation. This reads as
though the representation of an agency voice in expert elicitation is
threatened by over-emphasis on bias and conflict of interest. The
document suggests that, because of the unique character of site
characterization of a geologic repository, a DOE perspective qua
subject-matter expertise is a sine qua non for a successful expert
elicitation process. Curiously, wrapping this position in a concern to
elicit a diversity of views opens the door for an understanding of
rationality in choice consistent with post-positivist views of objectivity
as a basis for that rationality. These views of objectivity stress the
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representation and ultimate balancing of various scientific views in the
form of intersubjective agreement.
The Nuclear Regulatory Guidelines
The body of the Branch Technical Position (BTP) provides needed
treatment of expert elicitation. 14 It outlines and discusses nine steps as
components of an acceptable expert elicitation process. While much of
the process the NRC describes is found in the earlier versions of expert
election manuals and documents I reviewed in 1992, the tone of the
current report is quite different. Recognition of the potential for
circularity, bias, and the confusion of subjective belief with objective
data, present in the earlier guidelines, are all present in the BTP but
without the apologetics found in the earlier documents.
" Circularity in expert elicitation
The concern for overlapping roles found in the earlier literature
is expressed almost as a necessity in the BTP. Defining the objective
of the elicitation would ideally occur before the selection of experts.
But, NRC staff say that it is not necessary that the individual steps
be performed in the exact sequence they present. Subject matter
experts can help to better define the objective of the elicitation as
well as aid in the identification of additional information that could
facilitate the elicitation.
* The presence of bias in expert elicitation
The BTP reflects the NRC staff's keen awareness of the
potential for conflict of interest and the charge of bias resulting
from both this and other factors in the inquiry process that might
be identified as bias. The emphasis this report places on concern for
DOE conflict of interest is remarkable and represents a departure
from the earlier guidelines. Those guidelines, perhaps because they
are not specific to any agency application of expert elicitation, fail
to take seriously the conflicts that can result. A project's need to
turn to internal experts may reflect the limited number of experts
available to deal with uncertainties and the fact that those experts
are already employed by or on sub-contract with the expert
elicitation sponsor. The BTP points this out as an example of
14

See generally BTP, sipra note 1.
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potential conflict of interest and bias: "DOE has been criticized for
relying almost entirely on its own scientific experts and contractors,
15
with little or no external peer review."
It is the credibility of the expert judgments that are at stake
because of the "institutional influences, financial or professional
gain, or promotion of a social or political agenda." 16 To offset this
potential encumberment the NRC staff recommends a balance in
choice of experts and the disclosures of possible conflicts. In this
report, it does not recommend abandoning the use of DOE staff or
contractor staff. It assumes that any perceived or real conflict need
not influence professional judgments.
Additionally, the BTP report mentions "flexibility of thought
and the ability to objectively consider evidence that challenges
conventional wisdom" as a value in expert elicitation. 17 Diversity
of scholarly approaches, thereby avoiding "expert dependence"
should also be encouraged. The reliance on cognitive psychology in
distinguishing type of bias and in providing de-biasing techniques is
fully integrated as central to obtaining objective expert elicitation.
Transparency as an antidote to subjective belief
The NRC recognizes that the nature of inferences drawn from
expert elicitation sessions are inferences from beliefs, not from
traditional data collection. This Commission is motivated, in part,
by concern for over-reliance on expert judgment when modes that
are more traditional could be used. But among the conditions that
give rise to expert elicitation is the phenomenon of
underdetermination of hypothesis by evidence. "More than one
conceptual model can explain, and be consistent with, the available
data." 18 This difficulty, articulated throughout philosophy of
science literature, has spawned treatises on a spectrum of views
about the epistemological prospects for objectivity and truth in
science. This literature falls under the rubric of scientific realism
versus anti-realism and even the hermeneutical character of
15
16
17
18

Id. at 2.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 15.
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hypothesis confirmation.
The NRC (in the BTP) does not decide on this epistemological
issue. In not doing so, it makes no commitments to both a scientific
realism and a super-realism found in earlier federal guidelines.
Instead, it moves to offset the subjectivity of expert judgment
methodology by a demand for transparency. Such a demand is met
through proper documentation of reasoning, definitions,
assumptions, calculations, public or restricted literature used, and
the processing of expert judgments by such techniques as
smoothing, interpolation, extrapolation, or aggregation of the
19
judgments of different experts.
Such a strong demand for transparency is motivated by the
need for credibility and acceptability of DOE-sponsored work. The
controversial character of site characterization and subsequent
licensing of a geologic repository for the storage of high-level
nuclear waste may be ameliorated by such transparency. Bias will be
revealed, but a number of other benefits accrue to careful
documentation. Not least among these is the capacity to engage in
"technical discussions in terms of underlying principles rather than
20
just the individual outcomes."
Three of the issues that I discussed in 1992 as perceived problems
with the expert judgment method by its practitioners are not treated by
the NRC in 1996 as obstacles which bar the use of the methodology.
To some extent the NRC treatment of expert judgment appears rooted
in a more sophisticated epistemological commitment than that of naYve
positivism. Its recognition of circularity and interest in transparency
suggests an understanding that risk assessment, via expert elicitation, is
firmly rooted in a context of epistemic assumptions. Public policy
decisions built on recognition of such assumptions is a departure from a
naYve positivistic view that treats science as presuppositionless. However,
how deep NRC sophistication goes is difficult to determine. The
lengthy discussion of bias, while refreshing in its appearance and tone,
can function not simply as a red herring but more like a beached whale
in the way it may deflect attention away from the value-ladeness of
19 Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 30.
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expert elicitation method. On the other hand, the NRC's desire, in this
report, to effect transparency suggests it is aware that values play a role
in the assumptions on which expertise is built. I would prefer to think
that the NRC is not hunting and beaching whales. More on this below.
The Role of Values in Expert Judgment Elicitation
The philosopher of science, Helen Longino, adopts a helpful
distinction we can use in diagnosing the presence of values in the expert
elicitation method. 2 1 She delineates values as contextual and
constitutive. She suggests that the two types of values may be related
to each other.
Contextual values are defined by her as "personal, social, and
cultural values, those group and individual preferences about what
ought to be done." 2 2 For example, we live in a culture that values
commodification and commercialization. We believe, along with John
Locke, that we can convert material with labor into a result over which
proprietary interests are asserted. This is only one example of a
contextual value. Experts are persons rooted, simultaneously and
separately, in different contexts, ranging from the larger commercial
culture, the nuclear energy practitioner world, and the ivy towers of
academe, or the world of justice advocacy. They stand in some relation
to the values of these contexts in their implicit or explicit adoption or
rejection of the values of these contexts. As such, they are valuing
beings. When it comes to risk assessment via expert judgment, the naYve
positivist would have us believe that contextual values may play a
harmless role in the determination of objectives of an expert elicitation.
Constitutive values are those generated from an understanding of
the goals of science, such as truth, accuracy, simplicity, predictability
and breadth. A naYve positivist would see no legitimate role for values in
the elicitation method itself. Hence, he or she would tend to label
constitutive values as principles that govern one's inquiry or assumptions
associated with one's judgment. The post-positivist (and even the less
naive positivist) would argue that, whether they are labeled as such,
expert judgment method and expert elicitation in particular are
21 See Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific
Inquiry (1990).
22 Id. at 4.
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governed by many of these constitutive values, and in precise ways. Of
course, the interesting and important question is in what sense do social
and moral values shape scientific inquiry such that we see them appear
in more or less disguised form as constitutive values?
The choice to turn to expert elicitation as an acceptable
methodology for risk assessment in the site-characterization of a
geologic repository is itself a value statement. This choice asserts, first,
that uncertainty that might bar a nation from moving forward with
such a program is normatively trumped by necessity. Second, this
choice asserts that such uncertainty is justifiably overridden by a
pragmatism reflected in the perceived success of the method in siting
nuclear plant facilities. I may be explicitly stating an obvious normative
position.
The recognition of circularity in the elicitation procedures,
described above as overlapping of roles, belies a belief that good public
policy must be based on virtuous circularity. While circularity is itself
not normally considered a value, what lies behind it is a willingness to
risk a charge of bias in favor of predictability. Building in caveats when
describing expert elicitations, the NRC recognizes that conflict of
interest and bias may threaten such predictability. Acknowledgement
of such can be interpreted as a positivistic stance, as noted above.
Objectivity of the expert judgment methodology is preserved insofar as
this bias and conflict of interest are controlled by measures available
from cognitive psychology - measures that function much in the same
way that measures to insure reliability and validity of results do in
traditional empirical work. But the NRC staff hints that some of this
bias may not be controllable or detectable. NRC's combined
recommendation for balance in expertise and transparency of process,
as well as results, evidences a more post-positivist epistemological view.
That view does not shy away from the presence of values. It admits
them as integral to the knowing process and recognizes that objectivity
of truth is better understood as intersubjective agreement, ideally
among a community of equally empowered inquirers.
It is a short step from here to a fuller awareness of the role of values
internal to the expert judgment method. It is hard to say, from the
BTP alone, whether NRC staff are intentionally more sophisticated
12 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 107 [Spring 2001]

than they articulate, have just stumbled into making statements that
reflect such epistemic attitudes, or are pressed by force of
circumstances, i.e., political difficulties in moving nuclear waste disposal
forward, to admit the large role values play in expert judgment. A
multi-text analysis may tell the tale.
One final example illustrates my point. In its "Recommendations
for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty
and Use of Experts," the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee
(SSHAC), chaired by R. J. Budnitz, seeks to provide an up-to-date
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) methodology to guide
the analyst both technically and procedurally. 23 This report reads as a
set of guidelines for expert elicitation specific to seismic hazard analysis.
It is not as generic as the DOE or NRC guidelines described above.
One important result from their study is that differences in PSHAs
(e.g., earlier analyses performed by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)) were
not technical but are due to the information gathering and assembly
process used in the study. 2 4 Past PSHAs met the challenge of
incorporating the diversity of expert judgments into an analytical result
with different procedures. Regularizing or introducing more uniformity
into the analyses of disparate judgments can result in less difference.
One suggestion advanced by the PSHA in its Technical Facilitator
Integration (TFI) method is to downweight outlier judgments. An
outlier, as defined by the NRC in their BTP, "refers to those opinions
which lie apart from the views or expected (average) views of other
experts." 2 5 Since consensus is one of the goals of expert judgment
method, the SSHAC felt the need to define consensus and to do so in a
way that permits this downweighting. Four possible meanings of
"consensus" are considered, ranging from belief in the same
deterministic model or value for a variable, belief in the same
probability distribution, agreement that a particular composite
probability distribution represents the group of experts, to agreement
23 See Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee, Recommendations for Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts (NUREG/CR-6372;
UCRL-ID-122160, April, 1997) [hereinafter PSHA].
24 See id. at xi.
25 See BTP, supra note 1.
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that a particular composite probability distribution represents the
overall scientific community. 2 6 The SSHAC accepts the latter
definition of consensus as the easiest one to use. Hence, consensus in the
ordinary understanding of the expression is not likely to result from
PSHA. This is supported by the belief that no single interpretation
concerning a complex earth-sciences issue is a "correct" one (hints of
anti-realism). So, while the legitimate range of technically supportable
interpretations must be represented, they should also be assigned
relative importance or credibility by the technical integrator.
It is the technical integrator who will downweight a persistent
outlier interpretation. The sponsors of this report argue that "this is
preferable to the stiff adherence to an equal weighting scheme, which
can result in the final seismic hazard being driven by a single outlier
input." Downweighting the outlier in past expert elicitations has created
a logical trap, diminishing the expertise of someone a priorijudged to
be an expert. Now, justification of downweighting comes from the type
of consensus sought. "The perspective of developing a composite
representation of the overall community of scientists affords a way out
of the logical trap.... To represent the overall community, if we wish to
treat the outlier's opinion as equally credible to the other panelists, we
might properly assign a weight (in a panel of 5 experts) of 1/100 to his
,,
or her position, not 1/5. 27
Here we see epistemic values at work. On one hand, credibility is
defined as a function of relative distance from consensus. Outlier views
are not completely discredited. Rather, one's expertise is assigned a
credibility quotient in relation to its nearness to the agreement of other
experts. That agreement is assumed to represent the overall community
of scientists. Hence, novel or anomalous knowledge is overridden by
other values at work: epistemic democracy, ease, and simplicity.
The NRC is one of the sponsors of this report. Yet, in the BTP the
NRC asks for transparency in the aggregation process that "will render
these judgments including disparate views or outliers" useful for
subsequent analyses. The NRC requires that aggregation techniques be
accompanied by rationale as well as documentation "sufficient to trace
the impact of the individual expert's judgment on the consolidated
26 See PSHA, supra note 23, at 36.
27 Id.
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judgment and show what effect, if any, the disparate views would have
on design and/or performance." 2 8 The downweighting of the outlier's
views, at least by the Technical Integrator in an expert elicitation, seems
irrelevant to the NRC. Insofar as the Commission considers an outlier's
view in its examination of reports based on expert judgment, that
potentially equalizes the weight of that view. This departs from the
epistemic or constitutive value of downweighting suggested by the
SSHAC.
These epistemic differences must be understood as value
differences. To view them merely as principles or assumptions is to rob
them of their full normative impact and to disable one from connecting
the adoption of certain epistemic or constitutive values with contextual
values. To admit that the expert qua expert makes value judgments is
to, at least, move away from the naive positivism of earlier guidelines.
The positivist, Richard S. Rudner, legitimized this move in 1962 with
his famous essay "The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value
Judgments." 2 9 Post-positivism goes farther. It connects constitutive
and contextual values and, in some cases, chooses anti-realism as the
preferable epistemological view.
One may not want to, or need to, decide on what may appear to be
arcane philosophical issues, in grappling with the role of values in risk
assessments relevant to site characterization for a high-level nuclear
waste repository. However, introducing the rhetoric of valorization into
the expert judgment method further enables even greater transparency
in the acceptance of risk assessments based on expert judgment.
Transparency does not replace rationality but it is one of its conditions.
Bringing to light the variety of values and the way they are used will
help us to gauge whether rationality, defined as value-based decisionmaking resulting from intersubjective agreement among a community
of equally empowered (if not weighted) inquirers, has a future in
nuclear waste disposal, in its risk assessments, and in the expert
elicitation which will often underlie such assessments.

28 See BTP, supra note 1.
29 See Richard Rudner, The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments 492-98, in
Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science (E. D. Klemke et al. eds., 3d ed. 1998).

